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In  this  paper  we  consider  two  particular  Canadian  defined  benefit  pension  plans  to  illustrate  the 
importance of adequate mortality forecasting on actuarial liabilities. An employer who sets up an 
employee defined benefit pension plan promises to periodically pay a certain sum to the participant 
until  death.  Both  the  employee  and  the  employer  finance  these  periodical  payments  during  the 
beneficiary’s  career.  Any  shortcoming  of  funds  in  the  future  is,  however,  the  employer’s 
responsibility. It is therefore essential for the employer to be able to predict with a high degree of 
confidence  the  total  amount  that  will be  required to  cover  its  obligations to  the  future  retiree.  If 
increases in life expectancy were predictable and taken into consideration when establishing retirement 
funds, assessing future liabilities would be riskless in that respect. Unfortunately, future survival rates 
are uncertain. On that account, pensioners may outlive their life expectancies and expose pension 
funds to longevity risk. We present different tools to hedge this risk and the potential cost for two 
Canadian public pension plans. 
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Although we would all like for our lives to last longer, we would need to do so without running out of funds
once we’re old and grey. Lacking ﬁnancial resources is, however, one of the pernicious eﬀects stemming
from longevity risk, which we deﬁne as the risk that a population lives longer than anticipated. Put diﬀer-
ently, longevity risk is the risk that the annuitants’ anticipated life expectancy is less than their actual life
expectancy so that not enough money has been put aside to fulﬁll the annuitant’s future consumption needs.
Obviously, longevity risk greatly aﬀects the proﬁtability of institutions that oﬀer lifetime pensions. But
longevity risk also consistently aﬀects all levels of society, from individuals to companies and governments:
• To compensate for longevity risk alone, it has been estimated that companies should increase their
pension fund provisions by approximately 4%.
• For the Government of Québec, the implicit unfunded liability of the Régie des rentes du Québec is
172 billion dollars. The unfunded deﬁcit for the government employees’ various pension funds is 53
billion dollars.
• At worse, individuals risk running out of money after retirement; at best, they do not know how much
they should save today to adequately ﬁnance their retirement.
Two elements highlight the importance of longevity risk: the amount of money at stake (unfunded lia-
bilities for insurers and retirement funds represent more than 1,800 billion dollars in Canada alone) and the
systematic underestimation of the mortality rate. Turner (2006) reports that life expectancy has systemati-
cally been underestimated by about 18 months for each decade. Clearly, the decrease in the mortality rate
has important consequences on the viability of public and private pension funds, as well as on life insurance
companies, since underestimating life expectancy will lead to insuﬃcient accumulations. The importance
of longevity risk and exposure to it has recently been recognized by the international accounting standards
board, which has begun to tackle the problem of how to disclosure longevity risk in ﬁnancial statements (see
Fujisawa and Li, 2010).
One of the particularities of aggregate longevity risk is its non-diversiﬁable nature (see Milevsky et al.,
2006). As long as the aggregate mortality rate is known, individual deaths remain independent random
variables. The Law of Large Numbers can thus be applied: the larger the sample population, the more
the latter’s life expectancy tends toward that of the total population, and the more certain the sample’s
mortality rate. If the aggregate mortality rate is uncertain, then the Law of Large Numbers no longer
3applies as individual deaths are no longer independent variables. Indeed, for the aggregate mortality rate to
evolve, individual deaths must, on average, evolve in the same direction. They must therefore be partially
correlated. As a consequence, aggregate longevity risk is a non-diversiﬁable risk.
Aggregate longevity risk can thus be considered as a good and a bad thing for society. It is a positive
risk insofar as the population, on average, lives longer because of improved sanitary conditions and medical
innovations. Demographically speaking, this is positive progress. Financially however, the risk is negative.
Indeed, the retirement systems of developed countries rely on aggregate mortality rate forecasts. These
are generally in the form of the payment of a pension until the individual deceases. Thus, when the life
expectancy of a cohort of pensioners exceeds forecasts, the retirement system must pay in excess of the
level initially projected. It is then exposed to the risk of lacking the capital needed to meet its ﬁnancial
commitments. Also, given the non-diversiﬁable nature of aggregate longevity risk, it is diﬃcult for retirement
systems to hedge themselves against this risk.
Considering the size of the risk exposure and its undiversiﬁable nature, it has been argued that the
only way to potentially manage this risk is by drawing on the capital markets. Potential losses arising
from longevity risk are so large that they would likely be devastating for the insurance industry; for capital
markets, however, such losses are not uncommon. Thus, capital markets have the ability to absorb large
amounts of risk, much more so than the reinsurance market. This ability stems from the fact these markets
are very large and that their existing portfolios have, in general, virtually no exposure to this type of risk.
For the participants in the capital markets a potential beneﬁt is that assuming this type of risk could oﬀer
a new class of assets to money managers. Once again the reason is that such assets have zero or negligible
correlation to their portfolio of ﬁnancial assets. Thus, having exposure of this kind of risk can increase the
level of diversiﬁcation in their overall portfolio and therefore decrease the volatility of their entire book of
business. For this reason the capital markets have started to develop products and solutions that allow
ﬁnancial institutions to invest in mortality and longevity. The primary example of such a product is the
mortality swap whereby one party will pay a measure of expected mortality and in return will receive a
measure of actual mortality experience.
More recently investment banks have started to look more closely at other ways to sell longevity exposure
in the capital markets. As a result, mortality indices are being developed by the likes of Credit Suisse,
JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs. The JPMorgan index for instance, called LifeMetrics, provides data for
evaluating current and historical levels of mortality and longevity. The immediate advantage of such indices
is that they enable pension plans, insurers and reinsurers to measure mortality and longevity risk in a
4standardized manner. For such contracts to be a success both hedgers and speculators will have to ﬁnd it
attractive to transact in the market, and both will need to become familiar and comfortable with the use of
derivative products.
In this paper we consider Canadian deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans and stress the impact of adequate
mortality forecasting on actuarial liabilities. An employer who sets up an employee deﬁned beneﬁtp e n s i o n
plan promises to periodically pay a certain sum to the participant until his or her death. Although both
the employees and the employer ﬁnance may be asked to fund the plan during the beneﬁciary’s career, any
shortcoming of funds in the future is ultimately the employer’s responsibility. It is thus essential for the
employer to be able to predict with a high degree of conﬁdence the total amount that will be required to cover
its obligations to the future retiree. To do so, several assumptions must be made, speciﬁcally, the rate of
return on the assets before they are liquidated, the amount of the periodic payment (based on the employee’s
salary and indexation) and of course, the number of years the employee is expected to live after retirement
(i.e., the number of years that beneﬁts will be paid). All these factors have a very large impact on the actual
cost of the pension plan and on its solvency ratio. The conditional life expectancy is particularly diﬃcult
to predict due to medical improvements. For example, in 1950,a65 year-old Canadian male pensioner was
expected to live another 14.1 years. In 2006, a male with the same characteristics would go on to live another
19.5 years. This entails a 5.4 years of additional payments. Of course, such mortality trends can be modeled
to oﬀer predictions on future life expectancy. The Lee-Carter model is a simple one-factor model that oﬀers
ag o o dﬁt for mortality modeling over a wide range of ages. The model measures mortality rates on the
assumption that they are perfectly correlated at all ages. A more appropriate model would incorporate a
second factor to seize cohort eﬀects, however. That is, not only a parameter that captures the trend in
longevity improvement but also another that distinguishes the diﬀerent age dynamics. Our paper will use
such an approach base on the Cairns, Blake and Dowd model (the CBD model hereinafter).
Boucher and Boyer (2009, 2010) implemented the CBD model to the Canadian mortality tables. They
estimated the future increase in life expectancy of Canadian men and women aged 55 and over using data
from the Human Mortality Database and measured the longevity risk associated with issuing immediate and
diﬀered annuities by a pension fund. They then applied the CBD model to the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police’s pension plan. The choice of the institution was due to the fact that its actuarial report is publicly
available and because contributors and retirees are homogeneous. The present value of the expected future
beneﬁts was calculated using the projected mortality rates as forecasted by the Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary
(OCA). The present value was then compared to the one obtained using the results of the CBD model.
5Given the results, the plan’s value-at-risk (VaR) was calculated for diﬀerent levels of conﬁdence in order to
emphasize the uncertainty in future predictions.
The objective of this paper is to update and verify the results obtained by Boucher and Boyer (2010).
The CBD model is re-calibrated using the most up to date data from the Human Mortality Database. The
results of the regression are then applied to the RCMP’s pension plan and also to the Canadian Forces’
pension plan.
The 2008 Actuarial Report on the Public Service Death Beneﬁt Account oﬀers an indication of how the
actuary decreased future mortality. Mortality rates were expected to fall at decreasing rates for the next
two decades and then level oﬀ for the reminder of the report’s time horizon. This is quite diﬀerent from
the variation produced by the CBD model, where mortality rates decline constantly and continually. Hence,
there is an appreciable diﬀerence in the projected life expectancies. These are reﬂected in a considerable
divergence in the estimated pension funds’ actuarial values. The CBD model reveals an actuarial liability
signiﬁcantly superior to the fund’s reported liability. The same result is obtained when the model is applied
to the Canadian Forces’ pension plan. It is also revealed that the VaR of the CBD model varies greatly
according to the current age of the participant as well as to the type of the annuity (immediate versus
deferred).
The next section gives a broad outlook of the Canadian mortality improvements from 1921 to 2006.I t
illustrates that, during the observation period, Canadian life expectancy for newborns rose from 57.0 to
80.8 years while life expectancy among 65 year-olds rose from 13.6 to 20.0 years. Accordingly, gains in life
expectancy were 14% higher at age 65 than at birth. Section 3 presents the key features of the CBD model
and its diﬀerent applications. It shows that annuity premiums strongly depend on forecasted longevity
improvements. It also demonstrates that, even if future trends are taking into consideration when evaluating
present values, results will be highly uncertain. We also present in Section 3 some tools available to pension
fund managers that would allow them to manage the risk appropriately, and the diﬀerent participants in
such a market. In Section 4, the model is applied to concrete institutions, the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police and the Canadian Forces. It reveals how forecasted future mortality rates can aﬀect deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plans liabilities.
2 Mortality trends in Canada
This section aims to represent mortality trends in Canada since 1921 and illustrates the trends graphically.
The ﬁrst two ﬁgures depict life expectancies at birth and at age 65 for both Canadian men and women,
6whereas Figures 3 and 4 show the population survival curves (the probability that a newborn will survive to
a given age) for three diﬀerent years. Although not an exhaustive description of mortality trends, the ﬁgures
demonstrate that Canada has seen considerable improvements in life expectancy.
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As seen from Figure 1, mortality reductions at birth slowed down in the 1960’s. From 1921 to 1960, life
expectancy approximately rose by twelve years for men and sixteen years for women. This is much more
than the increase that occurred since 1960, namely ten years for men and nine years for women. The gap
between the two sexes has been narrowing since the 1980’s as we can see in the bar-charts of ﬁgures 1 and
2. Regarding life expectancy at age 65, it increased at a higher pace after 1960,e s p e c i a l l yf o rw o m e nO v e r
the period from 1985 to 2006, the percentage increase was higher for men than for women.















































































7Clearly, the probability of survival at any given age has been increasing. If increases in life expectancy
were predictable and taken into consideration when establishing retirement funds, assessing future liabilities
would be riskless in that respect. Unfortunately, future survival rates are uncertain. On that account, pen-
sioners may outlive their life expectancies and expose pension funds to longevity risk. Given that longevity
improvements are superior among the elderly and that pension plans are mostly aﬀected by declines in mor-
tality rates at older ages, the ﬁnancial impact of misestimating longevity is considerable for pension plan
sponsors and life-annuity providers. It is thus essential for a pension fund to quantify future longevity im-
provements. Failure to do so will lead to higher payouts than anticipated, which will result in the sponsoring
company suﬀering major losses. The next section provides an estimate of future mortality rates in order to
adequately ensure a pension plan’s solvency.
3 Mortality models and models for longevity risk
There exists a vast literature on mortality modeling. Commonly used by insurance companies, the Lee-
Carter model (see Lee and Carter, 1992) is a simple one-factor model that oﬀers a good ﬁto v e raf u l lr a n g e
of ages. Nonetheless, it estimates and forecasts mortality rates on the assumption that mortality is perfectly
correlated at all ages and prevents any cohort-eﬀect, an eﬀect that is speciﬁc to a particular year of birth.
As observed in historical life tables, improvement rates have been diﬀerent across age groups. Hence, a more
appropriate model would incorporate a second factor to seize this eﬀect. That is, not only a parameter that
captures the trend in longevity improvement but also another that distinguishes the diﬀerent age dynamics.
In contrast, the Cairns, Blake and Dowd (2006) model uses a more ﬂexible two-factor model.
Before introducing particular longevity forecasting models, it could be appropriate to see who could
participate in the capital markets solution for longevity risk. Consequently, we will now review the potential
sellers of longevity risk, their potential counterparties as buyers of this risk, and ﬁnally we describe the
potential role for ﬁnancial markets.
3.1 The market for longevity risk
3.1.1 Potential sellers of longevity risk
Apart from governments, three diﬀerent parties are currently exposed to longevity risk in Canada: Corpo-
rations that oﬀer a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plan to their employees, individuals and insurance companies.
These counterparties are naturally sellers of risk.
Companies are exposed to longevity risk via the pension plans they oﬀer their employees and in particular,
8deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans. On average, 7% of funds were under capitalized in 2009.1 With the move from
deﬁned beneﬁtp l a n st od e ﬁned contribution plans, pension funds now share the burden of longevity risk with
individuals. As mortality rates decrease, a fund’s capital must be shared between more pensioners over a
longer period. Finally, insurance companies are exposed to longevity risk through the annuity plans they oﬀer.
In a lifetime annuity contract, an individual exchanges a sum of money for the guarantee that he will receive
periodic income until he dies. He is therefore sheltered from individual longevity risk. Insurers sell a large
volume of contracts and estimate the price at which they must sell these annuities using aggregate mortality
rate forecasts. When these forecasts are incorrect, the insurer makes more payments than anticipated and
will not have sold its annuities at a high enough price.
3.1.2 Potential buyers of longevity risk
There are two existing potential counterparties which are likely to assume this risk: insurers and reinsurers,
the government and the ﬁnancial markets.
Insurance companies’ transactions are based on the principle of diversiﬁcation: by selling a large volume
of policies, the variance tends towards zero and the risk is therefore diversiﬁed. However, as mentioned
above, the aggregate component of longevity risk is not diversiﬁable. Therefore, insurance companies are
reluctant to oﬀer longevity products such as annuities. Indeed, including this risk in their balance sheet
requires that they maintain a large capital reserve, which can be costly. They may also choose to transfer
the risk to reinsurers, who also prefer to minimize their exposure.
Also to be considered is the adverse selection that exists in relation to the sale of longevity products:
individuals that subscribe these policies are also those who are likely to live longer than the average pop-
ulation. Adverse selection is doubled in this scenario. Agents wishing to subscribe to annuity plans are
generally those who assume they will live a long life because they have a healthy lifestyle, for example. This
is active adverse selection. Agents that subscribe these types of contracts are also the wealthiest. Yet, there
is a strong negative correlation between wealth and the mortality rate: wealthy people generally live longer
than the average population. This is passive adverse selection.
As a consequence, insurance companies are reluctant to issue longevity products and therefore issue few
of them, at a high price, which further emphasizes the problem of adverse selection. However, longevity
products can allow them to hedge the mortality risk to which they are exposed as a result of their life
insurance policies. Use of the private system, via insurance contracts, therefore seems limited.
1DBRS (June 2010), Canadian Private Pension Plans in 2009 — Performance Maintained, Challenges Remain, Industry
Study.
9The government could on the other hand be a player of interest. It is the only agent that can transfer the
risk eﬃciently from one generation to another through ﬁscal and monetary policy. Younger generations are
better able to adapt to longevity risk as their wealth is mostly comprised of their own human capital. On
the other hand however, individuals who have already retired have only their pension entitlement. Thus, the
government attempts to transfer the longevity risk to younger generations that are more apt to assume it.
This raises one question however: Do governments transfer longevity risk eﬃciently? If governments make
policies only to please current voters, this theoretical eﬃciency may not translate into reality. One must
therefore question if the government is fulﬁlling its role adequately.
The government could also contribute to the development of longevity risk market instead of being
an active participant. In the context of a system based on longevity insurance policies, governments can
make lifetime annuity plans mandatory for the entire population to reduce adverse selection problems. This
would, however, only be a partial solution to the problem as the wealthier population, which lives longer
than average, would receive a larger share of the annuities paid. The government could purchase longevity
bonds to allow insurance companies to partially hedge their risk. Purchasing longevity securities would only
increase the State’s exposure to longevity risk in a context where governments already face high-debt level
challenges.
Finally, the ﬁnancial markets may be willing to assume the longevity risk. Diversiﬁed investors and
hedge funds could be interested in ﬁnancial instruments based on longevity risk for two reasons. First, the
correlation between this asset class and other asset classes is very low. Secondly, given their very risky
nature, longevity securities and instruments oﬀer high returns. Thus, an investor beneﬁts from an asset that
has both a high return and a low correlation to other assets. Surely this must push the eﬃcient frontier up
and to the left.
Another potential counterparty would group together businesses that stand to beneﬁt from a population
that lives longer. The example of insurance companies has already been mentioned. There are also companies
that provide the elderly with products and care services. These include pharmaceutical companies - the longer
the population lives, the greater the consumption of medications — and retirement homes. In fact, these
companies’ transactions are mainly based on the consumption of the elderly. They are therefore exposed
to longevity risk and would be an interesting counterparty to whom longevity risk could be transferred.
However, these players have, up until now, shown little interest in the longevity market.
At present longevity risk is a market in which supply and demand are unbalanced: several counterparties
seek to sell this risk, but there are few players willing to assume it. Insurance companies and the government
10are in a poor position to do so, which means that only ﬁnancial markets seem to be a viable solution.
3.1.3 Future role of the ﬁnancial markets
Within the scope of ﬁnancial markets, hedging against longevity risk is achieved through the creation of
derivatives of which the cash ﬂows would depend on the mortality rates observed. The higher the survival
rates observed, the greater the cash ﬂow for the hedge buyer. Here we would like to mention that society
can not eliminate longevity risk; it is simply redistributed to the economic agents most apt to assume it.
These longevity ﬁnancial instruments can take on many forms, but will generally have a long-term
maturity. Researchers have already proposed bonds, futures, swaps and even options. Also, there is an
important balance that must be respected when building these products. Very standardized products (such
as futures contracts) that generate greater market liquidity and limit counterparty risk can be developed.
On the other hand, this type of instrument can not adequately hedge a counterparty seeking to eliminate all
exposure to longevity risk. Indeed, mortality patterns vary greatly depending on the population: Canadian
mortality diﬀers from American mortality. Also, the mortality of Canadian white-collar workers is diﬀerent
than that of Canadian blue-collar workers, etc. For example: the pension fund of a business present only
in Quebec is looking to hedge itself against longevity risk. It therefore buys a derivative indexed to North-
American mortality. It is therefore highly likely that this hedge will be ineﬀective given too high a level of
risk. These longevity products are therefore diﬃcult to model.
3.1.4 LifeMetrics and other longevity indices
The mortality models we will present allow for the modelling and potential forecasting of mortality rates.
This means that derivative products could be constructed based on such models. An important alternative
(see Boyer, Favaro and Stentoft, 2010) would be to construct mortality or longevity indices and model these
directly. If the objective is to develop market-traded derivatives to hedge longevity risk one needs a longevity
index.
One example of such a mortality index is LifeMetrics, developed by JP Morgan, which provides data for
evaluating current and historical levels of mortality and longevity. Other participants are Credit Suisse and
Goldman Sachs which have also created mortality indices. The following ﬁgure plots the mortality rates of
four regions for men aged 65 as provided by LifeMetrics (Netherlands, Denmark, United States, and England
and Wales).
11Figure 5
Inasmuch as the indices enable pension plans, insurers and reinsurers to measure mortality and longevity
risk the main beneﬁt and the reason for their design is to facilitate the structuring of longevity securities
and derivatives. There are several problems with the existing indices which impedes their direct use though.
For instance, most of the existing indices are based on the general population or a particular portfolio of
lives and therefore may not be representative of an annuity writer’s exposure. The basis risk is therefore
potentially large.
3.2 The Lee and Carter model
The model proposed by Lee and Carter (1992) is represented by the following equation for the natural
logarithm of the mortality rate for the year t of a person of age x:
ln(mx,t)=ax + bxkt + εx,t. (1)
Mortality rate is then a function of three terms: two dependant on age x, and one dependant on the year
t.P u td i ﬀerently, there is a parameter a and a parameter b for each age x (both are ﬁxed over time), and
a parameter kt whose value varies according to the year t, but are identical for any age x.I n o r d e r t o









12The variable kt, which is a time indicator of the mortality level, provides a general idea of the global
mortality level for each year t. The lower the mortality rates across all ages throughout the year, the smaller
the value of k for that year. Given that the sum of all of the kt values must equal 0, the years during which
mortality rates were the lowest are assigned a negative kt. If, using historical data, we observe a trend of
decreasing kt values over the years, this means that mortality rates have a tendency to decline over time.
The bx values provide the sensitivity of the mortality rate of a speciﬁc age to changes in the level of overall
mortality. For an age x, the higher the value of bx, the more impact a variation of the kt values will have on
the mortality rates of people this age. Finally, ax represents the log-average over time of the mortality rates
of people of age x.
3.2.1 Estimation of the Lee-Carter model
Due to the fact that only the mx,t’s are observed, it is impossible to perform an OLS regression directly to
estimate this model. Lee and Carter (1992) propose two methods for estimating their model (see Renshaw
and Haberman, 2006, for an extension). The ﬁrst is based on the singular value decomposition method,
whereas the second is an approximation. Using the latter, we estimate the Lee-Carter model in several
stages.
1. We ﬁrst calculate each ax. As previously explained, these values are, for all x, the average over time
of the natural logarithm of the mortality rates at age x.L e t t i n gn denote the the number of years of







2. We then estimate each kt. Given that the sum of the bx values has been ﬁxed at 1, these values can
be approximated. For each t,t h ekt values equal the sum across all ages of the diﬀerence between the






3. We estimate the bx using a linear regression over time. For each x value, we perform a linear regression
without constant where the dependant variable is the diﬀerence between the natural logarithms over
time of the mortality rates at age x and the parameter ax associated with this x v a l u e( f o u n di ns t e p
1), and where the explanatory variable is the kt values (found in step 2). Thus, for each x value, we
regress y =l n( mx,t) − ax on x = kt.T h ec o e ﬃcients corresponds to the estimated values of bx.
134. Finally we re-estimate kt to incorporate the life tables observed in reality. Indeed, they have been
calculated in such a manner that each mortality rate at each age is of the same signiﬁcance. However,
certain age categories are larger than others. As a consequence, a same mortality rate for two diﬀerent
ages will not necessarily represent the same number of deaths. Lee and Carter therefore propose a
re-estimation of the kt values by iteration using observations of the size of each population for each age
and the number of deaths. Thus, let Nx,t denote the size of the population of age x in the year t and
let Dt denote the number of deaths, inclusive of all ages, in the year t.F o re a c ht, we must determine,





for each t.I np a r t i c u l a r ,eax+bxkt corresponds to the mortality rate of individuals of age x in the year
t. The number of individuals of age x in t is then multiplied by this mortality rate and we thus obtain
the number of deaths in the year t among individuals of age x. The same calculation can be performed
for all x values. The sum of the number of deaths in the year t allows us to obtain the total number
of deaths for that year. We must then ﬁnd the k value of the period that is as close as possible to the
total number of deaths. A new study by iteration is performed for each t.
Once these four stage have been completed, we know the ax,t h ebx and the kt values that make it possible
to model, as realistically as possible, the surface of the mortality observed, the latter corresponding to the
diﬀerent mortality rates over time and across all ages.
3.2.2 Forecasting with the Lee-Carter model
Given the values of ax, bx and kt we can then use the Lee-Carter model to forecast future mortality rates.
In particular, the coeﬃcients ax and bx are presumed ﬁxed over time by the Lee-Carter model and vary only
with age. However, the kt values evolve over time. Thus, estimating future mortality rates using this model
implies projecting the future values of kt.
Given that the kt values reﬂect the general level of mortality over time, they can actually be modeled
as a time series. In Lee and Carter (1992) it is proposed that an ARIMA model can be used to model
the evolution of the kt and hence this allows us to estimate the future values of kt. Depending on the
characteristics of the men’s series of kt values, and that of the women, we will select the ARIMA model with
the best performance.
14For example, in an AR(1) model, the model is written as
kt = θ + φkt−1 + εt,
where εt ∼ N
¡
0,σ2¢
and where φ<1 for stationarity. Under these assumptions we can estimate the values
of θ and φ using a linear regression method, and calculate the variance of the residual εt values. Based on
this, the future values can then be simulated.
3.3 The Cairns, Blake and Dowd model
Let qx (t) represent the probability that a person aged x in calendar year t dies within one year. As shown
in [?], the rate of mortality may be represented as a two-factor model
qx (t)=
eA1(t+1)+A2(t+1)(x+t)
1+eA1(t+1)+A2(t+1)(x+t),t∈ {0,1,...,T− 1} (2)
The ﬁrst parameter, A1 (t),a ﬀects all ages by the same amount whereas the second parameter, A2 (t),
aﬀects higher ages much more than lower ages. Using the property qx (t)=1−px (t) (where px (t) represents








= A1 (t +1 )+A2 (t +1 )( x + t) (4)
so that we can estimate A1 (t) and A2 (t) for all t using ordinary a least squares regression technique.
3.3.1 Forecasting with the Cairns, Blake and Dowd model
The next step consists in forecasting values of A(t). To properly ascertain future outcomes, stochastic
modeling must be used as it produces probability distributions for each estimate and not only single points
forecast. In this regard, we extrapolate the risk factors with a bivariate random walk with drift.
A(t +1 )=A(t)+μ + CZ(t +1 )
D(t +1 )=μ + CZ(t)
where Z(t) is a n-dimensional standard normal random variable, and vector μ ∈ Rn and matrix C ∈ Rn×n




C is chosen as the Cholesky factor of the covariance matrix V .
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We run a simulation to obtain the forecasted values of A(t) and use those values to calculate e zx (t +1 )
e zx (t +1 )=l n
e qx (t +1 )
e px (t +1 )
= A1 (t +1 )+A2 (t +1 )( x + t +1 ) (5)
This enables us to obtain the evolution of mortality rates through time
e qx (t +1 )=
eh zx(t+1)
1+eh zx(t+1) (6)
3.3.2 Incorporating parameter uncertainty in the simulation
In the classical simulation approach the estimated parameters are taken as given. However, the initial
parameters of our model μ and V are subject to some degree of uncertainty due to limited information.
Based on m observations, [?] suggest that the posterior distribution for μ,V | D should be

























(D(t) − b μ)(D(t) − b μ)
0
Using this information we can adjust our results for parameter uncertainty. For each previously gener-
ated path of A(t) we simulate V from the inverse-Wishart distribution and μ from a multivariate normal
distribution and use these values for the rest of the sample path.








γ = SZ where Z ∼ N (2,m− 1)


























Given that actuarial reports for the Royal Canadian Mountain Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Forces (CF)
are publicly available, we will now apply the CBD model to measure the longevity risk of the two deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans. The beneﬁt corresponds to a percentage of the employee’s salary multiplied by the
number of years of pensionable service. Since payments are set in advance, it is crucial to determine the
number of future payments (i.e., the number of years the pensioners is expected to live). We will calculate
the actuarial liability using two methods: The Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary (OCA) method as well as the
CBD method. We will stress the diﬀerence between the two by calculating the ratio of CBD to OCA. A
ratio greater than one implies that the CBD model predicts higher survival rates.
Economic and demographic hypotheses are taken from the OCA’s report. Table 1 depicts the nominal
rates and indexing adjustments used to calculate the actuarial value of pensions.
Year Inﬂation Real rate Nominal rate Indexing
2009 2.00% 3.00% 5.00% 2.50%
2010 2.00% 3.00% 5.00% 2.00%
2011 2.00% 3.00% 5.00% 2.00%
2012 2.00% 3.00% 5.00% 2.00%
2013 2.10% 3.00% 5.10% 2.00%
2014 2.20% 3.00% 5.20% 2.10%
2015 2.30% 3.00% 5.30% 2.20%
2016 2.40% 3.00% 5.40% 2.30%
2017 2.40% 3.00% 5.40% 2.40%
2018 2.40% 3.00% 5.40% 2.40%
2019+ 2.40% 3.40% 5.80% 2.40%
Table 1
Table 2 shows the initial and ultimate plan year mortality reductions (%). For the CBD model, we
ﬁtted a least-squares line through the natural logarithms of the projected central death rates. The average
annual rates of improvement were then obtained by taking the complement of the exponential of the slope.
To be consistent OCA assumptions, the model was calibrated using data from 1989 to 2006. The gap
between mortality rates for men and women is diminishing so that Canadian men should experience higher
improvement rates than Canadian women over the next decades,as displayed in Table 2.T h e d i ﬀerence
between the OCA and the CBD models lies in the way in which mortality rates evolve through time. In the
OCA model, mortality reductions between 2009 and 2029 were obtained using linear interpolation; hence
rates of improvements are constantly diminishing during this period.
17Males Females
OCA CBD OCA CBD
Age 2009 2029+ 2009+ 2009 2029+ 2009+
45 1.75 0.70 2.85 1.40 0.70 1.98
50 1.86 0.70 2.67 1.46 0.70 1.84
55 2.05 0.70 2.49 1.40 0.70 1.71
60 2.24 0.70 2.31 1.34 0.70 1.57
65 2.43 0.70 2.13 1.28 0.70 1.44
70 2.35 0.70 1.95 1.25 0.70 1.30
75 2.10 0.70 1.76 1.25 0.70 1.16
80 1.70 0.70 1.57 1.10 0.70 1.02
85 1.05 0.64 1.38 0.70 0.64 0.87
90 0.60 0.40 1.17 0.35 0.40 0.73
95 0.20 0.40 0.96 0.10 0.40 0.57
100 0.00 0.40 0.75 0.00 0.40 0.42
105 0.00 0.40 0.53 0.00 0.40 0.27
Table 2
Although mortality improvements used in our calculations are the same as the overall Canadian popula-
tion, mortality rates are relatively lower. Fortunately, the actuarial reports of the two cases we will study,
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Armed Forces, present assumed mortality rates for
2009 of individuals aged between 30 and 110. These are shown in Table 3.
RCMP Canadian Forces
Age Regular members Male
Male Female Oﬃcer Other rank
30 0.0006 0.0003 0.0005 0.0008
40 0.0010 0.0006 0.0006 0.0009
50 0.0020 0.0010 0.0013 0.0027
60 0.0051 0.0032 0.0039 0.0091
70 0.0156 0.0100 0.0152 0.0261
80 0.0534 0.0295 0.0588 0.0691
90 0.1478 0.0942 0.1487 0.1567
100 0.2829 0.2304 0.3151 0.3286
110 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
Table 3
Mortality rates are given only for successive 10-year intervals of age. To ﬁnd intermediate ages we used
cubic spline interpolation. We then transformed mortality rates into central death rates and backed-out the
values to 2008 by applying the following relation
mx (t)=
mx (t +1 )
1 − ix (t)
(7)
18where ix (t) corresponds to the improvement in mortality for a person aged x at time t. Finally, starting in
2008, we applied mortality reductions to the central death rates for the remaining of the time span using
both the OCA and the CBD models.
4.1 Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Before estimating the actuarial liability of the RCMP’s pension plan, we oﬀer a brief description of its
members. RCMP’s workforce is divided into two categories: Regular and civilian members. Regular members
account for the majority of the personnel. Of the 15,505 pensioners, 94% are men and 88% are former regular
members. In terms of contributors, there are 15,990 (75%)m e na n d5,222 (25%) women. Since the RCMP is
male-dominated, longevity risk is essentially independent of the evolution of female mortality rates. Finally,
84% of contributors are regular members (17,862)a n d16% are civilian members (3,350). Table 4 presents
the RCMP’s pension plan’s balance sheet in millions of dollars for 2005 and 2008.
Balance sheet ($ millions), Pension Plan of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
As at 31 March 2008 As at 31 March 2005
Actuarial value of assets 14,823 12,284
Actuarial liability 14,301 11,382
Regular members
- Contributors 5,737 4,996
- Retirement pensioners 6,393 4,823
- Disability pensioners 623 365
- Surviving dependants 315 232
Civilian members
- Contributors 627 542
- Retirement pensioners 411 282
- Disability pensioners 63 43
- Surviving dependants 22 20
Administrative expenses 110 79
Actuarial surplus / (deﬁcit) 522 902
Table 4
The plan’s total actuarial liability is equal to 14,301 millions of dollars. The present value of pensions
paid to the current retirees represents 48% of this total, whereas another 45% includes the present value of
future payable beneﬁts to contributors that are not yet in payment. The remainder of the actuarial liability
is ascribable to the pensions oﬀered to pensioners with a disability and surviving dependants. We also note
from the balance sheet that pension promises made to regular member (pensioners and contributors) account
for 85% of the actuarial liability. Consequently, we shall concentrate our analysis on this subgroup.
194.1.1 Retirement pensioners
Even if we concentrate only on regular members, the actuarial report does not contain all the information we
need to evaluate the actuarial liability so we must make a few assumptions. For instance, we use the median
age for each quinquennial age groups. In addition, we must assume that each year a pensioner receives an
amount equal to the average annual pension of its age group. Finally, we do not include values for ages
below 45 and above 84 since they represent only 2% of the pensioners. Results are shown in Table 5.
Male Female
Age Ratio Liability % retired Ratio Liability % retired
(CBD/OCA) ($ millions) (CBD/OCA) ($ millions)
45 − 49 1.0184 163.40 2.660 1.0062 37.25 0.606
50 − 54 1.0170 834.39 13.583 1.0060 54.87 0.893
55 − 59 1.0153 1,908.81 31.074 1.0057 31.37 0.511
60 − 64 1.0139 1,641.41 26.721 1.0057 9.42 0.153
65 − 69 1.0135 798.32 12.996 1.0061 0.42 0.007
70 − 74 1.0143 434.96 7.081 1.0073 0.28 0.005
75 − 79 1.0163 208.28 3.391 −− −
80 − 84 1.0186 19.50 0.317 1.0106 0.07 0.001
Total 1.0150 6,009.07 97.824 1.0060 133.68 2.176
Table 5
Total liabilities ascribable to regular members are equal to 6,393 million dollars according to the RCMP’s
balance sheet. In table 5, our calculations give us a total liability for regular members of 6,143 million dollars.
The diﬀerence between the two values comes from the fact that we were unable to reconstitute perfectly the
calculations (because we use the median age rather than the actual age of the members). The diﬀerence is
small, however, and should only have a marginal impact on the measure of longevity risk. Compared to the
OCA model, the CBD model predicts on average higher diminution in mortality rates, hence the ratio of
actuarial liabilities is always greater than one. Furthermore, the discrepancy is lower for intermediate ages.
In fact, the diﬀerence is 1.84% for members aged 45 to 49 and 1.86% for members aged 80 to 84. In contrast,
the diﬀerence is only 1.35% for members in the age group of 65 to 69. Luckily, intermediate ages constitute
the majority of actuarial liability, so the total diﬀerence is attenuated to 1.50%. At last, the disparity is
much lower for females, ranging from 0.57% to 1.06%. Consequently, females have almost no impact on the
plan’s solvency, since males account for 97.82% of actuarial liability.
The above evaluation is accomplished using the most probable trajectory of mortality rates. Longevity
risk represents a departure from this trajectory. To demonstrate how sensitive the present value of future
payments is to projected mortality rates, we calculated the relative and nominal Value-at-Risk at the 95th
and 99th level. This risk measure is deﬁned as the maximum expected loss in case of an adverse deviation
20in the evolution of mortality rates. All values are presented in Table 6.
Relative Value-at-Risk
Male Female
Age VaR VaR VaR VaR
(95%) (99%) (95%) (99%)
45 − 49 2.39 3.59 0.69 1.02
50 − 54 2.58 3.89 0.75 1.10
55 − 59 2.75 4.17 0.80 1.18
60 − 64 2.90 4.41 0.85 1.25
65 − 69 3.01 4.59 0.89 1.31
70 − 74 3.06 4.67 0.92 1.36
75 − 79 3.04 4.65 −−
80 − 84 2.93 4.48 0.92 1.37
Table 6A
Nominal Value-at-Risk ($ millions)
Male Female
VaR VaR VaR VaR
(95%) (99%) (95%) (99%)
3.977 5.966 0.260 0.383
21.878 32.992 0.413 0.609
53.339 80.781 0.252 0.372
48.274 73.375 0.080 0.119
24.346 37.114 0.004 0.006
13.504 20.622 0.003 0.004
6.435 9.833 −−
0.583 0.891 0.001 0.001
Table 6B
As shown in a previous section, there is a positive correlation between the longevity risk premium and
the age of the policyholder. Hence, it is normal that we obtain higher values-at-risk for older age cohorts.
Moreover, we notice that for both genders and for all levels of conﬁdence, the relative VaR increases continu-
ally until it reaches a peak in the age bracket 70 to 74, and then decreases. Since there is a small probability
that a pensioner aged 75 and older lives much longer than predicted, the VaR is relatively smaller for those
ages. In terms of dollars, the VaR is remarkably superior for members for whom the actuarial liability is
highest; in our case, members aged 50 to 59. Finally, because longevity risk is mainly driven by males, their
relative and nominal values-at-risk are always greater than those of females.
4.1.2 Contributors
To determine actuarial liability with respect to contributors we must determine the amount of future pay-
ments based on current annual earnings. For calculation purposes we take the median age of each group, the
median year of pensionable service and average pensionable earnings. Also, to simplify matter, we assume
that a member that has less than 20 years of service receives a deferred annuity that starts being eﬀective at
age 60. A member that retires after 20 to 24 years of service is given an annual allowance. And a member
with more than 25 years of service collects an immediate annuity. All types of beneﬁts are indexed in the
ﬁrst year following retirement.
The annual amount received is equal to 2% of the average pensionable earnings multiplied by number of
credited service under the plan. Starting at age 65, the annual pension amount is reduced by a percentage
of the indexed Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) annual pensionable earnings multiplied by the years of CPP
pensionable service. In our evaluation all contributors will reach age 65 in 2012 or later, hence in all cases the
21appropriate reduction factor will be 0.625 per cent as we see in Table 7 Panel A. Furthermore, as presented
in Table 7 Panel B, in the case of an annual allowance, payments are further reduced by 5% for each year
by which pensionable service is less than 25 or by which the age at retirement is less than 60 (the lesser of
the two). For example, omitting any pension increases due to indexing, a regular male member that retires
in 2008 at age 42 with 22 years of pensionable service receives $34,162 in annual allowances until he reaches
the age of 65 at which point he receives $28,324.
Calendar years
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012+
Coordination percentage 0.685% 0.670% 0.655% 0.640% 0.625%
Table 7A
Age at departure 42 years old
Average salary $91,343
Years of pensionable service 22
Pension that would have been payable starting at age 60 2% × 22 × $91,343 = $40,191
Reduction 5% × (25 − 22) × $40,191 = $6,029
Annual allowance payable from age 42 $40,191 − $6,029 = $34,162
CPP/QPP integration reduction 0.625% × 22 × $42,460 = $5,838
Annual allowance payable from age 65 $34,162 − $5,838 = $28,324
Table 7B
The Table 8 results were obtained, where (d) refers to the case of a deferred annuity and (i) refers to
that of an immediate annuity. We observe once again larger ratios for males than for females; but most
interestingly, we notice that the ratios are greater for contributors than for pensioners. Since the time
span is much longer for contributors, it is not surprising that dissimilarities among the models in forecasted
mortality, and consequently in actuarial values, are accentuated. Moreover, for both types of annuities
the ratio becomes closer to one as the pensioners gets older. The OCA model relies on the assumption
that mortality rates decrease at a diminishing rate whereas the CBD model presumes that mortality rates
decrease continually. On that account, the divergence in actuarial values is highlighted at younger ages
because the projection period is longer. It is even more important for diﬀered annuities considering that
payments start only at age 60. For example, given a policyholder under 25 years of age, the dissimilarity
b e t w e e nt h et w om o d e l si sa sg r e a ta s6.49% for males and 6.16% for females. However, the discrepancy
diminishes with age. In total, under the CBD model, actuarial liability is 2.07% higher for males and only
220.86% higher for females.
Male Female
Age Ratio Liability % retired Ratio Liability % retired
(CBD/OCA) (million $) (CBD/OCA) (million $)
−25(d)1 .0649 5.85 0.100 1.0186 1.95 0.033
25 − 29(d)1 .0634 32.34 0.551 1.0182 13.78 0.235
30 − 34(d)1 .0570 89.37 1.524 1.0167 41.43 0.706
35 − 39(d)1 .0499 209.30 3.569 1.0149 84.53 1.442
40 − 44(d)1 .0420 325.90 5.558 1.0129 86.23 1.470
40 − 44(i)1 .0169 360.96 6.156 1.0055 123.84 2.112
45 − 49(d)1 .0335 148.45 2.531 1.0107 25.37 0.433
45 − 49(i)1 .0166 1,387.57 23.662 1.0056 210.68 3.593
50 − 54(d)1 .0250 48.56 0.828 1.0085 10.78 0.184
50 − 54(i)1 .0157 1,691.61 28.847 1.0055 114.10 1.946
55 + (d)1 .0202 13.00 0.222 1.0073 3.01 0.051
55 + (i)1 .0149 812.12 13.849 1.0055 23.34 0.398
Total 1.0207 5,125.02 87.397 1.0086 739.04 12.603
Table 8
Lastly, we calculate the relative and nominal VaRs. We distinguish between immediate and deferred
annuities on the basis that they exhibit diﬀerent levels of risk. Results are detailed in Tables 9.
Relative Value-at-Risk
Male Female
Age VaR VaR VaR VaR
(95%) (99%) (95%) (99%)
−25(d)6 .25 9.10 1.83 2.68
25 − 29(d)6 .20 9.06 1.80 2.64
30 − 34(d)5 .85 8.62 1.68 2.47
35 − 39(d)5 .43 8.06 1.54 2.27
40 − 44(d)4 .95 7.40 1.40 2.06
40 − 44(i)1 .93 2.87 0.56 0.83
45 − 49(d)4 .40 6.61 1.24 1.83
45 − 49(i)2 .16 3.24 0.62 0.92
50 − 54(d)3 .79 5.72 1.08 1.59
50 − 54(i)2 .38 3.58 0.69 1.01
55 + (d)3 .39 5.12 0.97 1.43
55 + (i)2 .50 3.78 0.73 1.07
Table 9A
Dollar Value-at-Risk ($ million)
Male Female
VaR VaR VaR VaR
(95%) (99%) (95%) (99%)
0.390 0.567 0.036 0.053
2.132 3.116 0.252 0.371
5.525 8.138 0.706 1.038
11.937 17.710 1.322 1.946
16.820 25.115 1.220 1.797
7.077 10.552 0.699 1.029
6.756 10.145 0.318 0.469
30.427 45.644 1.321 1.946
1.886 2.846 0.117 0.172
40.810 61.539 0.786 1.159
0.449 0.679 0.030 0.044
20.622 31.180 0.171 0.252
Table 9B
As demonstrated earlier, the longer the time horizon, the less precision the model oﬀers. Henceforth it
is harder to predict future mortality rates for younger cohorts since the forecasting period is longer. This
is illustrated by a decreasing relative value-at-risk with age. The dollar VaR is greater for the age brackets
where policyholders are mostly concentrated.
234.2 Canadian Forces
To further emphasize on the impact the choice of a forecasting model has on actuarial liability, we repeat
our methodology using the Canadian Forces’ pension plan. However, since all tables unveil the same charac-
teristics, we only compare the magnitude of the longevity risk faced by both the RCMP and the Canadian
Forces.
For the RCMP we considered regular members of both genders. Because the institution consists mainly of
men; we showed that females do not have a great impact on actuarial premiums. The Canadian Forces is even
more homogeneous, that is to say, 95% of pensioners and 85% of contributors are males. For instance, there
are 70,480 male as opposed to 3,396 female pensioners, and 57,573 male to 9,869 female contributors. Since
females will have almost no impact on actuarial liability, we decided to exclude them from our evaluation
of the Canadian Forces pension plan and only consider the two main classes of employees: male oﬃcers
and males of other ranks. Finally, because 94% of actuarial liability is imputable to active contributors
and retirement pensioners, we omit all other classes in our evaluation. Table 10 details the plan’s ﬁnancial
situation.
Balance sheet ($ millions), Pension Plan of the Canadian Armed Forces
As at 31 March 2008 As at 31 March 2005
Actuarial value of assets 52,224 45,383
Actuarial liability 50,532 42,701
- Active contributors 16,246 14,565
- Retirement pensioners 31,127 25,301
- Disability pensioners 379 385
- Surviving dependants 2,626 2,275
- Administrative expenses 154 175
Actuarial surplus / (deﬁcit) 1,692 2,682
Table 10
The Canadian Forces’ actuarial liability is much higher than the RCMP’s; it amounts to 50,532 millions
of dollars. Notwithstanding, apart from the nominal values-at-risk, our results are independent of the
principal; they are merely conditional upon the forecasted mortality rates. All information used in our
calculations is presented in Appendix B. We included the number and average annual pension as at March
2008 for male retirement pensioners in addition to the number and average annual pensionable earnings for
male contributors. The tables for the pensioners do not distinguish between oﬃcers and other ranks, so
we assumed that they are represented in the same percentage in each quinquennial age as they are in the
overall population, particularly, 23% oﬃcers and 77% other ranks. Interestingly, oﬃcers and other ranks are
24represented in identical proportion among the male contributors.
4.2.1 Retirement pensioners
To be consistent with our assumptions made in the RCMP’s evaluation, we considered exclusively pension
with indexing and we did not include values for ages above 84. Note that there are no pensions oﬀered to
policyholder under 55 years of age. Results are shown in Table 11.
Oﬃcers Other ranks
Age Ratio Liability % retired Ratio Liability % retired
(CBD/OCA) ($ millions) (CBD/OCA) ($ millions)
55 − 59 1.0152 536.86 3.352 1.0118 1,630.85 10.182
60 − 64 1.0136 1,095.16 6.837 1.0091 3,293.19 20.560
65 − 69 1.0128 1,024.37 6.395 1.0080 3,075.36 19.200
70 − 74 1.0135 718.39 4.485 1.0089 2,176.75 13.590
75 − 79 1.0157 422.40 2.637 1.0114 1,300.40 8.119
80 − 84 1.0180 180.20 1.125 1.0140 563.75 3.520
Total 1.0140 3,977.39 24.831 1.0096 12,040.29 75.169
Table 11
When calculating the ratio of CBD to OCA we cancel all periodic payments and we are left with an
annuity factor (present value of a stream that provides one unit each period). Accordingly, the discrepancy
between the two actuarial values is entirely attributable to diﬀerences in mortality forecasting among the
models. Attesting this conjecture, we compare the results of the RCMP’s males and the Canadian Forces’
male oﬃcers. Both groups have essentially the same mortality rates as at 2008; they should consequently
have similar ratios. This is exactly what is observed. Finally, there appears to be a negative relation between
the ratios and the initial mortality rates. Since our model predicts better longevity improvements than the
OCA model, the diﬀerence between the two models becomes larger as the time horizon increases. Hence,
the greater chance of survival in the far future, the higher the ratios. Consequently, it is not surprising that
the group that has the highest mortality rates, speciﬁcally Canadian Forces’ males of other ranks, has the
lowest percentages. Table 12 presents the relative and nominal values-at-risk of the Canadian Forces.
Relative Value-at-Risk
Oﬃcers Other ranks
Age VaR VaR VaR VaR
(95%) (99%) (95%) (99%)
55 − 59 2.72 4.13 3.14 4.60
60 − 64 2.87 4.37 3.27 4.81
65 − 69 2.98 4.54 3.35 4.94
70 − 74 3.02 4.61 3.37 4.98
75 − 79 2.98 4.55 3.31 4.88
80 − 84 2.84 4.35 3.16 4.66
Table 12A
Dollar Value-at-Risk ($ millions)
Oﬃcers Other ranks
VaR VaR VaR VaR
(95%) (99%) (95%) (99%)
14.829 22.515 51.746 75.985
31.867 48.525 108.596 159.832
30.895 47.154 103.948 153.250
21.980 33.596 74.096 109.269
12.766 19.524 43.578 64.203
5.218 7.983 18.089 26.616
Table 12B
25As expected, the RCMP’s males and the Canadian Forces’ male oﬃcers have analogous relative values-
at-risk. Moreover, we notice that the percentages are lowest for the RCMP’s females and highest for the
Canadian Forces’ males of other ranks. Since any deviation from the expected trajectory is heightened at
higher central death rates; the relative VaRs are positively correlated to the initial mortality rates. Figure
6 illustrates graphically our results. Note that RCMP females have lower relative VaRs since they have
comparatively lower mortality rates and inferior longevity improvements.
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Figure 6
Ultimately, we observe that the amount of actuarial liability only aﬀects the nominal VaR. In addition,
since other ranks are more numerous than oﬃcers their nominal values-at-risk are always greater.
4.2.2 Contributors
The calculations are essentially the same as for the RCMP,. For members with less than 20 years of service,
a deferred annuity at age 60 is provided and for members with more than 20 years of service an immediate
annuity is oﬀered. Results are shown in Table 13. At the risk of sounding repetitive, we observe comparable
values for members that have homologous mortality rates even though their pension diﬀers. We also notice
that for immediate annuities the ratios are higher for groups that have lower initial mortality rates. The
opposite is observed for deferred annuities. For instance, for a policyholder aged 25 years of age, we must
predict mortality rates for another 35 years before calculating the annuity. Since longevity improvements
are higher for the CBD model, mortality rates at age 60 are much lower than the ones predicted by the
OCA. For that reason, the ratios are largest for the Canadian Forces’ males of other ranks. For example,
the diﬀerence between the CBD and OCA is as high as 7.07% for members of other ranks aged 25 to 29, but
26only 6.21% for oﬃcers. Starting at age 45, the forecasting period is shorter; hence the impact of mortality
reduction is lower. In that case, the results are comparable to the ones obtained for immediate annuities.
Oﬃcers Other ranks
Age Ratio Liability % retired Ratio Liability % retired
(CBD/OCA) (million $) (CBD/OCA) (million $)
−25(d)1 .0624 13.08 0.097 1.0725 57.61 0.429
25 − 29(d)1 .0621 58.54 0.436 1.0707 171.17 1.275
30 − 34(d)1 .0564 159.09 1.185 1.0626 293.07 2.183
35 − 39(d)1 .0494 277.66 2.068 1.0535 668.01 4.975
40 − 44(d)1 .0417 182.61 1.360 1.0432 303.26 2.259
40 − 44(i)1 .0167 1,245.93 9.279 1.0171 2,748.18 20.467
45 − 49(d)1 .0335 73.90 0.550 1.0324 61.32 0.457
45 − 49(i)1 .0165 1,830.21 13.630 1.0157 2,699.94 20.108
50 − 54(d)1 .0252 30.14 0.224 1.0219 12.48 0.093
50 − 54(i)1 .0157 1,192.26 8.879 1.0134 959.01 7.142
55 + (d)1 .0204 8.31 0.062 1.0164 3.05 0.023
55 + (i)1 .0150 255.19 1.900 1.0118 123.32 0.918
Total 1.0210 5,326.93 39.672 1.0234 8,100.42 60.328
Table 13
As seen from Figure 7, around age 55, pensioners have relatively higher ratios than contributors. As
mentioned earlier, the ratio of CBD to OCA is equivalent to an annuity factor. For pensioners, since the
average annual amount is already reduced by the CPP oﬀset, the annuity generates a series of equal payments
of one for all the projection period. In contrast, the amount disbursed to contributors must be lowered once
the policyholder reaches age 65. In that event, the present value is comparatively smaller.






















































Finally, we display the relative and nominal values-at-risk. We observe once more in Table 14 that the
27relative VaRs are positively correlated to the initial mortality rates.
Relative Value-at-Risk
Oﬃcers Other ranks
Age VaR VaR VaR VaR
(95%) (99%) (95%) (99%)
−25(d)6 .13 8.98 7.60 10.81
25 − 29(d)6 .18 9.08 7.55 10.78
30 − 34(d)5 .87 8.69 7.08 10.18
35 − 39(d)5 .44 8.11 6.53 9.44
40 − 44(d)4 .95 7.42 5.88 8.55
40 − 44(i)1 .95 2.92 2.19 3.18
45 − 49(d)4 .40 6.64 5.15 7.52
45 − 49(i)2 .16 3.25 2.41 3.52
50 − 54(d)3 .80 5.75 4.36 6.38
50 − 54(i)2 .37 3.59 2.64 3.87
55 + (d)3 .40 5.15 3.85 5.65
55 + (i)2 .50 3.79 2.78 4.08
Table 14A
Dollar Value-at-Risk ($ millions)
Oﬃcers Other ranks
VaR VaR VaR VaR
(95%) (99%) (95%) (99%)
0.850 1.245 4.693 6.680
3.845 5.648 13.830 19.748
9.862 14.599 22.039 31.687
15.849 23.624 45.952 66.468
9.417 14.121 18.598 27.039
24.714 37.017 61.231 88.875
3.363 5.069 3.263 4.763
40.172 60.497 66.194 96.535
1.173 1.775 0.555 0.814
28.740 43.478 25.690 37.610
0.288 0.437 0.119 0.175
6.478 9.822 3.470 5.090
Table 14B
5C o n c l u s i o n
The goal of this paper was to present an assessment of the cost of longevity risk for two Canadian public
pension plans: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Armed Forces. Longevity risk is
deﬁned in our context as the risk that a pension plan will run out of funds before the last pensioner has
died, not because of misappropriation of funds or bad investment, but because the life expectancy of the
pensioner was under-estimated. In a broader context, longevity risk represents the risk that an organization
(corporation, insurer) or an individual lives longer than the assets that were put aside. This risk is becoming
more and more important in value as the general population in Canada, and in the developed as well as
in the developing world, is living longer upon retirement. The speciﬁcity of this risk is that is cannot be
diversiﬁed through the law of large numbers since it represents a macro risk.
The current paper compares two models to forecast longevity. There are, of course, a much larger set
of models in the academic literature that attempt to achieve such forecasts. These would undoubtedly oﬀer
predictions that would diﬀer from we presented. Nonetheless, using a portfolio of model approach highlights
the risk inherent to the diﬃculty of predicting long-term longevity. Managing appropriately the longevity risk
(and funding it accordingly) should attract the attention of both sponsors and authorities to fully apprehend
the scope of the underlying uncertainty. No model can be said to replicate the trends of mortality through
time, but plans can incorporate additional reserves to compensate for this risk. This is what we did. Using
28a simulation method of future mortality, we calculated the necessary reserves that would ensure, with 95%
or 99% certainty, that the fund will not run out of money because of an underestimation of the mortality
If the projections we made using a Lee-Carter model of an Cairns-Blake-Dowd (CBD) model turn out
to be correct, the longevity risk faced by the pension plans of both the RCMP and Canadian Forces is
substantial. Our model may even be too optimistic in the sense that stochastic mortality trends are over-
estimated even with these two model. The reason is that both models assume implicitly that longevity
improvements will be continuous, even in the far future. If on the other hand future mortality trends vary
by leaps and bounds rather than continuously, our forecast over-estimates future mortality, which means
that current plan sponsors are under-reserving for future longevity risk shocks. There are diﬀerent views on
how future mortality rates may evolve through time. Some pretend that there is a biological limit to life
while others predict that mankind can achieve physical immortality. Since scientists disagree on the limit
of longevity, selecting a forecasting model is a subjective process. In this regard, there is no clear way of
knowing whether the CBD model is adequate and superior to the OCA. Actually, the purpose of this paper
is not to claim that one predictive model is more appropriate than the other, but rather to highlight the
impact the choice of model can have on the solvency ratio of a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan. By comparing
the assumptions made by the Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary with those of the CBD model, we can clearly
ascertain that there is a signiﬁcant divergence in the present value of future beneﬁts for both the RCMP and
the Canadian Forces plans. These diﬀerences can eventually imply several hundreds of millions of dollars in
either additional contributions or in surplus. Both cases can imply negative consequences for the promoter
of the plan.
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